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NOTES
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT
THE INTER VIVOS TRUST

-

It may be regarded as settled that the ultimate burden of the
federal estate tax is a matter of local law' and that apportionment
statutes as such are not violative of the United States Constitution
in their operation.

2

In general there are two views in regard to placement of the tax
burden in any estate: the common law presumption that taxes shall
be paid from the residuary estate 3 and the statutory presumption of
proration among all beneficiaries. 4 Some states have adopted the
latter by judicial application, 5 and at least one state has expressly prohibited proration. 6 The Florida statute7 requires proration of the
estate tax among all "persons interested in the estate" unless a contrary intent has been expressed in the particular dispositive instrument that passes the property upon which the tax is levied. The intrastate effect of this statute poses no particular difficulty. But when a
Florida domiciliary has previously created an inter vivos trust in
another state, while a resident of that state, the effectiveness of the
statute is less certain. Under the federal tax laws an inter vivos trust
can be brought into the taxable estate in various ways,8 and under
the Florida statute the trust may be required to bear a proportionate
share of the tax burden. This note will discuss the problems that
arise when a Florida personal representative seeks contribution from
an inter vivos trust in the state in which the trust has its physical and

1Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924); 1

PAUL,

FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT

TAXATiON §13.54 (1942).

2Riggs v. del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
3See Sutter, Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax in the Absence of Statute
or an Expression of Intention, 51 MicH. L. Rv. 53 (1952).
4Most state apportionment legislation is modeled upon the New York statute,
N.Y. DEC. EST. LAw §124, adopted in 1930.
5
E.g., Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936) (foreshadowing the
enactment of the proration statute); Regents of the University System v. Trust Co.
of Georgia, 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.2d 691 (1942).
BALA. CODE tit. 51, §449 (Supp. 1953).
TFLA. STAT. §734.041 (1955).
8E.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§2035-38.

[194]
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administrative situs. 9 Contribution presumably would not be required by the United States Constitution under the due process
clause, since the test in choice of law is reasonableness, or under the
full faith and credit clause, because of the forum's "exclusive" substantive law jurisdiction over the trust itself.10 Ultimate control by
the situs state cannot be denied.
EXTENT OF THE CASE LAW

There is a dearth of case law on this precise issue. Treatment of
the problem by the four jurisdictions that have thus far considered it
gives some indication of the divergent views that may be expected
unless steps are taken to insure a uniform result.
In the case of In re Gato's Estate" a Florida decedent had created
two inter vivos trusts in New York. Since he had retained a life income in the trusts, they were included in his taxable estate.' 2 As a
result the estate tax was greater than the entire probate estate, a consequence that aptly demonstrates not only the virtues of apportionment but also the necessity for uniform treatment of the problem
among the states. The New York court directed that the trustee turn
over the pro rata share of the estate tax in accordance with the Florida
apportionment statute and in the amount determined by the Florida
county judge's court.' 3 In yielding to the law of the domicile the court
reasoned that the most important factor involved, that is, the domi14
nant interest, is the taxing power of the domiciliary state:
"[S]o long.., as a decedent's estate is in process of administration, the rights of the beneficiaries thereof, including beneficiaries of property constituting part of the gross taxable estate,
although not in the probate estate, are not completely fixed
and ascertained; . . . during such period the property consti-

tuting the gross taxable estate remains within the state's
For an exhaustive study of all conflicts phases of apportionment see Scoles,
Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes and Conflict of Laws, 55 COLuM. L. Rxv.
261 (1955).
'old. at 293.
11276 App. Div. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't), afi'd, 301 N.Y. 653, 93 N.E,2d
924 (1950).
12INT. Rrv. CODE of 1954, §2036.
-3FrA. STAT. §734.041 (1) (1955).
'4276 App. Div. 651, 659, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171, 179 (1st Dep't 1950).
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taxing power and within the state's power to control the ultimate impact of the tax burdens thereon. It is immaterial
whether an estate taxable inter vivos transfer, or a disposition
by will or under intestacy laws, is involved. For all tax purposes, property in an inter vivos trust, revocable up to the date
of the decedent's death, is treated as the settlor's own property no gift tax is payable upon the transfer, the income is taxed
to the settlor, and the property is included in the settlor's
gross estate for estate taxes."
The court's rationale for the reference to the internal law of the
domicile is based essentially on the importance of the taxing power
of the domiciliary state. It should follow that when a trust is comprised of New York realty, over which the exclusive taxing power
of the situs state is unquestioned, there would not be a reference
back. The fact, however, that the New York courts have consistently
looked to the law of the domicile in apportionment cases, whether
the trust involves realty or personalty, 15 indicates that there must be
some other basis for the reference.
The Massachusetts court, in Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit and
Trust Co.,16 refused to accept the reasoning that the dominant interest is in the domiciliary state:
"It is apparent that the trust owes its validity to the law of this
Commonwealth. All rights of the beneficiaries of the trust are
derived from our law. The trust is from every point of view a
Massachusetts trust. The laws of Maine never had anything
to do with it. The trustee has done nothing by which it has
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of Maine. The person who
succeeded to [the settlor's] interest in the trust upon his decease
did so not through the laws of Maine but according to the
terms of the trust as previously established under Massachusetts
law .... The only possible connection between this trust and the
State of Maine which we are able to discover is that the Federal
government in imposing an estate tax has seen fit to aggregate
the probate estate in Maine and the trust fund in Massachusetts
15In re Peabody's Estate, 115 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1950); In re Corner's Trust,
101 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Peabody,
190 Misc. 66, 68 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
16325 Mass. 469, 472, 91 N.E.2d 334, 336 (1950).
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into a single 'gross estate.' We cannot see how this circumstance gives power to either State to impose by statutory fiat
liabilities upon the fiduciary or the property under the exclusive jurisdiction of the other State. ... It seems to us that to
apply the Maine statute in this case would be to give to that
statute extraterritorial effect contrary to first principles."
In First National Bank v. First Trust Co.'7 the decedent had retained a life income in a trust created in Minnesota in favor of the
three children of his first marriage. He subsequently moved to Florida
and had two children by a second marriage. The Minnesota court
adopted the reasoning of the Isaacson case and denied the claim for
contribution. As a result the entire estate tax burden was placed on
the second wife and her children.
In the recent case of Knowles v. National Bank:' the Michigan
court, whose attention apparently was not called to the above cases,
failed to see a conflict of laws problem in similar facts. The decision
merely held that an ex parte Florida court order calling for apportionment was not res judicata as to trustees of the Michigan inter
vivos trusts. 19 The result placed the entire burden of the estate tax
on the Florida assets, even though approximately fifty-seven per cent
of the tax was attributable to the property in the Michigan trusts.
THE PREFERABLE CHOICE OF LAW

The primary burden of paying the estate tax is on the personal
representative at the domicile.20 Since the tax lien, which extends
to all assets in the taxable estate,2 ' is used only as a last resort in most
instances, this device does not eliminate the need for uniform treatment of the problem by the various jurisdictions having dominion over
a portion of the property in a given estate. In placing the tax burden,
uniformity can be achieved by reference to a single jurisdiction,
whether the law of that jurisdiction is apportionment or nonapportionment. Thus the orderly administration of the estate would not
be thrown into a maze of jurisdictional disputes by the application
1764 N.V.2d 524 (Minn. 1954).
1876 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1956).

lDThe case should not, therefore, be considered as authority on the conflict
of laws phase of the apportionment problem.
2

0INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§2002, 6901 (a).
-lINT. REV. CODE of 1954, §6324 (a).
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of potentially as many rules as there are states involved. Probably
the most important policy factor favoring the application of a single
rule is the resulting predictability, which would eliminate the wasteful
ordeal of litigating claims for contribution in foreign situs courts.
Assuming that this uniformity is desirable, there is the further
problem of deciding whether the assets of the estate will be subjected
to the law of the decedent's domicile or to the law in effect elsewhere,
as, for example, the law of the situs of the asset in question. Policies
favoring a reference to the domiciliary state logically outweigh any
22

other.

The decedent's family will presumably be in the domiciliary
state, where they will be protected by provisions such as Florida's
homestead law, family allowance, and widow's share statutes. Whether
the law of the domicile calls for proration of the estate tax or for
payment from the residuary, the law will be geared to an efficient coordination of the domicile's over-all family protection policies. 23 Failure of the situs state to refer to the domicile can render these provisions nugatory.
The presumed intent of the testator-settlor may not be inappropriate as a second argument favoring reference back to the domiciliary
state. Admittedly the problems and uncertainties of the estate tax
burden are eliminated if the intent of the testator or settlor is
clearly expressed in the dispositive instrument. In the absence of such
expression, however, it may be argued that the decedent certainly
would not want his testamentary scheme upset by the introduction
of a variety of rules allocating the tax burden. Against this it may be
said that the decedent wished to completely subject his inter vivos
221t may be argued that in a case in which the major portion of the estate is in
a state other than the domicile the law of that state should be applied. This
reasoning would not solve the situation, however, if the major portion of the estate
were located in two or more states other than the domicile. It is suggested, therefore, that uniform reference to the domicile is, in the last analysis, the preferable
choice of law.
23An example of how the burden of tax problem is uniquely geared to the
over-all family protection policy in a given state is the Florida dower provision,
FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1955). The widow is entitled to one third of her husband's
probate estate free from all liabilities, except that when it "shall have the effect
of increasing the estate tax, her dower shall be ratably liable with the remainder
of the estate for the estate taxes due by the estate of her deceased husband." Thus,
if the dower interest exceeds the maximum marital deduction allowed under §2056
of the Internal Revenue Code the excess will bear its proportionate share of the
estate tax. In re Fuch's Estate, 60 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
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trust to the laws of the state in which it was created. The weakness
of either argument is apparent, since the fact that no provision was
made indicates that the decedent and the draftsman overlooked the
tax burden problems.
The domiciliary reference can be accomplished by incorporating
the tax burden problem into the conflict of laws rule at the situs;
the economic and social desirability of the reference to the domicile
would thus become a part of the situs state's general policy governing
decedents' estates. Then, regardless of the forum, the reference would
be first to the law of the situs, where, by virtue of the conflicts rule,
a further reference would be made to the decedent's domicile.
THE ROLE OF THE DRAFTSMAN

In drafting an inter vivos trust that may possibly find its way into
the taxable estate, the specific directions of the settlor as to whether
the trust is to be held ratably liable for its share of the estate taxes
should be expressed in unambiguous terms. Similarly, in will drafting
special reference should be made to property passing outside the instrument. The draftsman must keep in mind that there are really
two parts of the taxable estate, the probate portion and the nonprobate portion. When the taxable estate comprises inter vivos trusts,
gifts made in contemplation of death, transfers with retained benefits,
jointly owned property, life insurance proceeds payable to named
beneficiaries, or any other property passing outside the probate
estate, the burden of estate tax should be carefully considered and
placed specifically on the portion or portions of the estate in accordance with the desires of the testator or settlor.2 4 The draftsman
should not rely on the fact that the testator's or settlor's intent coincides with the legal presumption in effect when the instrument is
drawn, since the law may be changed before the levy of the estate
tax.
LEGISLATION: THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION

The ultimate solution of the conflicts problem in estate tax apportionment lies in federal legislation, for it is the federal tax that
gives rise to the difficulties. Assuming that apportionment of the
24See Shepherd and Pruyn, Tax Aspects of Will Draftsmanship, 84

TRUSTS AND

ESTATES 599, 600 (1947).
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estate tax burden among beneficiaries is desirable, this uniform result
might easily be obtained by a federal law. Provision has already been
made for contribution from certain assets: federal laws require proportionate contribution, in the absence of contrary intent, from certain
life insurance proceeds and property subject to a power of appointment. 25 Although extension to include all assets would eliminate the
conflict of laws difficulties, the federal law goes no further.20 Apart
from over-all apportionment, the problem could be minimized by
enactment of a federal statutory reference to the decedent's domicile.
In the absence of federal legislative action the states could adopt
a workable interstate system by enacting a standard statutory reference to domicile for apportionment cases. 27 The difficulty with
this proposition, however, is that all jurisdictions would have to
adopt the statute to completely eliminate the conflicts problem.
Until the situation is remedied by legislation the courts should
recognize the economic and social desirability of reference to the
domicile. By incorporating this phase of decedents' estate law into
the conflict of laws rule the result is obtained.
The problem of apportionment is new, and major shifts in policies
now in effect may be expected. The Florida practitioner should be
constantly aware of the unforeseen tax burdens that can "mutilate ...
beyond recognition"28 the estate planning of an otherwise effective
testamentary scheme.
SIDNEY C. WARD

2

5INT. RV. CODE of 1954, §§2206-07.
261NT. RFV. CODE of 1954, §2205: "... . so far as is practicable and unless otherwise directed by the will of the decedent the tax shall be paid out of the estate
before its distribution."
27For example: "Apportionment of taxes against assets of non-residents. Estate
or death taxes imposed by the United States by reason of the inclusion of real
or personal property located or administered in this state in the estate for tax
purposes of a non-resident of this state shall be apportioned among the persons
interested in the estate to whom such property may be transferred or to whom any
benefit accrues only in accordance with the law of the decedent's domicile applicable
to property located therein." Scoles, supra note 9, at 309.
281 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §13.54 (1942).
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